

Chapter 2

ADVANCED FORENSIC FORMAT: AN OPEN, EXTENSIBLE FORMAT FOR DISK IMAGING

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Abstract This paper describes the Advanced Forensic Format (AFF), which is designed as an alternative to current proprietary disk image formats. AFF offers two significant benefits. First, it is more flexible because it allows extensive metadata to be stored with images. Second, AFF images consume less disk space than images in other formats (e.g., EnCase images). This paper also describes the Advanced Disk Imager (AImage), a new program for acquiring disk images that compares favorably with existing alternatives.

Keywords: Disk imaging, image storage, Advanced Forensic Format (AFF)

1. Introduction

Most forensic practitioners work with just one or a few disks at a time. A wife might bring her spouse's laptop to an examiner to make a copy a few days before she files for divorce. Police might raid a drug dealer's apartment and seize a computer that was used for contacting suppliers. In these cases, it is common practice to copy the drive's contents sector-for-sector into a single file, a so-called "raw" or "dd" copy. Some practitioners make a sector-for-sector copy of the original disk to a second drive that is the same size as the original.

Raw images are widely used because they work with practically every forensic tool available today. However, raw images are not compressed, as a result, they can be very large—even if the drive itself contained very little data.

The obvious way to solve the problem of data storage is to use a file compressor like `gzip` [9] or `bzip2` [20]. But neither `gzip` nor `bzip2` allow

random access within a compressed file. Because many forensic tools require random access to captured data just like a file system requires random access to a physical disk, disk images that are compressed must be decompressed before they can be used.

A second problem with raw images is the storage of data about the image itself, i.e., its metadata. Because a raw image is a sector-for-sector copy of the drive under investigation, the file cannot store metadata such as the drive’s serial number, the name of the investigator who performed the acquisition, or the date on which the disk was imaged. When metadata is not stored in the image file itself, there is a chance that it will become separated from the image file and lost—or even confused with the metadata of another drive.

After evaluating several of the existing alternatives for storing disk images, we decided to create the new Advanced Forensic Format (AFF™) for our forensic work. AFF is open and extensible, and unencumbered by patents and trade secrets. Its open-source implementation is distributed under a license that allows its code to be freely integrated into other open-source and propriety programs.

AFF is extensible—new features can be added in a manner that maintains forward and backward compatibility. This extensibility allows older programs to read AFF files created by newer programs, and it allows newer AFF programs to read older AFF files that lack newer features.

This paper presents our research on the design and implementation of AFF. We have used AFF to store more than one terabyte of data from imaged hard drives using less than 200 GB of storage. We are currently working to improve the functionality and performance of the AFF implementation and associated tools.

2. Related Work

Several formats exist for forensic images, but none offers AFF’s combination of openness and extensibility. This section surveys the most common formats in use today. Some commercially-available tools support formats other than their own. Nevertheless, support for proprietary formats, which is often the result of reverse engineering, tends to be incomplete.

2.1 EnCase Format

Guidance Software’s EnCase Forensic [12] is perhaps the *de facto* standard for forensic analysis in law enforcement. It uses a proprietary format for images based on ASR Data’s Expert Witness Compression Format [4]. EnCase’s Evidence File format (Figure 1) contains a physical




Figure 1. EnCase format.

bitstream of an acquired disk, prefixed with a “Case Info” header, interleaved with CRCs for every block of 64 sectors (32 KB), and followed by a footer containing an MD5 hash for the entire bitstream. The header contains the date and time of acquisition, examiner’s name, notes on the acquisition, and an optional password; the header concludes with its own CRC.

The EnCase format is compressible and searchable. Compression is block-based [17], and “jump tables” and “file pointers” are maintained in the format’s header or between blocks “to enhance speed” [14]. Disk images can be split into multiple files (e.g., for archival to CD or DVD).

A limitation of the EnCase format is that image files must be less than 2 GB in size. As a result, EnCase images are typically stored in directories with the individual file’s given names (e.g., FILE.E01, FILE.E02, etc.). The format also limits the type and quantity of metadata that can be associated with an image. Some vendors have achieved limited compatibility by reverse-engineering the format; however, these attempts are generally incomplete.

Table 1. Comparison of AFF and EnCase (all values in MB).

| | | Zeroes | Shakespeare | Random |
|---------------|---------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| AFF | -X1 | 28 | 2879 | 6301 |
| | -X6 | 6 | 2450 | 6301 |
| | -X9 | 6 | 2443 | 6301 |
| Encase | “Good” | 33 | 3066 | 6303 |
| | “Best” | 12 | 2846 | 6303 |

Table 1 compares the sizes of AFF and EnCase images of a 6 GB hard drive. The hard drive was filled with: (i) all zeroes, (ii) the complete works of William Shakespeare repeated approximately 1,200 times, and (iii) random data. AFF used `gzip` compression performed at levels “1,” “6” and “9” with `aimage -X1, -X6 and -X9` options. EnCase compression was performed using the “Good” and “Best” levels.

2.2 Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Formats

AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit (FTK) [1] is a popular alternative to EnCase. It supports the storage of disk images in EnCase’s file format or SMART’s file format (Section 2.9), as well as in raw format and an older version of Safeback’s format (Section 2.7).

2.3 ILook Formats

ILook Investigator v8 [15] and its disk-imaging counterpart, IXimager, offer three proprietary, authenticated image formats: compressed (IDIF), non-compressed (IRBF) and encrypted (IEIF). Few technical details have been disclosed publicly. However, IXimager’s online documentation [15] provides some insights: IDIF “includes protective mechanisms to detect changes from the source image entity to the output form” and supports “logging of user actions within the confines of that event.” IRBF is similar to IDIF, except that disk images are left uncompressed. IEIF encrypts disk images. To facilitate compatibility with ILook Investigator v7 and other forensic tools, IXimager allows for the transformation of each of these formats into raw format.

2.4 ProDiscover Format

Technology Pathways’ ProDiscover family of security tools [23] uses the ProDiscover Image File Format [22]. It consists of five parts: a 16-byte image file header, which includes a signature and version number for an image; a 681-byte image data header, which contains user-provided metadata about the image; image data, which comprises a single block of uncompressed data or an array of blocks of compressed data; an array of compressed blocks sizes (if the image data is compressed); and i/o log errors describing any problems during the image’s acquisition. The format is fairly well documented, but it is not extensible.

2.5 PyFlag Format

PyFlag [17] is a “Forensic and Log Analysis GUI” developed by the Australian Department of Defence. It uses `sgzip`, a seekable variant of the `gzip` format. (PyFlag can also read and write ASR Data’s Expert Witness Compression Format [19].) By compressing blocks (32 KB by default) individually, `sgzip` allows for rapid accessing of a disk image by forensic software without the need to first decompress the entire image. The format does not associate metadata with images [18, 19].

2.6 RAID Format

Relatively few technical details of DIBS USA's Rapid Action Imaging Device (RAID) [8] are publicly available. It offers "built-in integrity checking" and is designed to create an identical copy in raw format of one disk on another. The copy can then "be inserted into a forensic workstation" [7].

2.7 SafeBack Format

SafeBack [3] is a DOS-based utility designed to create exact copies of entire disks or partitions. It offers a "self-authenticating" format for images, whereby SHA-256 hashes are stored along with data to ensure the integrity of images. SafeBack's developers claim that the software "safeguards the internally stored SHA-256 values" [3].

2.8 SDi32 Format

Vogon International's SDi32 [25] imaging software is designed to be used with write-blocking hardware. It is capable of making identical copies of disks to tape, disk or file, with optional CRC32 and MD5 fingerprints. The copies are stored in raw format.

2.9 SMART Formats

SMART [5] is a software utility for Linux designed by the original authors of Expert Witness (now sold under the name EnCase) [12]. It can store disk images as pure bitstreams (compressed or uncompressed) or in ASR Data's Expert Witness Compression Format [4]. Images in the latter format can be stored as a single file or in multiple segment files, consisting of a standard 13-byte header followed by a series of sections, each of type "header," "volume," "table," "next" or "done." Each section includes its type string, a 64-bit offset to the next section, its 64-bit size, padding, and a CRC, in addition to actual data or comments, if applicable. Although the format's "header" section supports free-form notes, an image can have only one such section (in its first segment file only).

2.10 Comparison of Formats

Table 1 provides a comparison of the features offered by various file formats. A format is considered to be "non-proprietary" if its specification is publicly available. It is "extensible" if it supports the storage of arbitrary metadata. It is "seekably compressed" if it can be searched without being uncompressed in its entirety. A bullet (●) indicates sup-

Table 2. Summary of features supported by various file formats.

| | Extensible | Non-Proprietary | Compressed & Seekable |
|--------------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| AFF | • | • | • |
| EnCase | | | • |
| ILook | ? | | • |
| ProDiscover | | • | • |
| PyFlag | | • | • |
| RAID | | • | |
| SafeBack | ? | | ? |
| SDi32 | | • | |
| SMART | | • | |

port for a feature, while a question mark (?) indicates that support for a feature is not disclosed publicly. FTK is omitted because it uses other tools' formats.

2.11 Digital Evidence Bags

Turner proposed the concept of a Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) [24] as a “wrapper” or metaformat for storing digital evidence from disparate sources. The DEB format consists of a directory that includes a tag file, one or more index files, and one or more bag files. The tag file is a text file that contains metadata such as the name and organization of the forensic examiner, hashes for the contained information, and data definitions. Several prototype tools have been created for DEBs, including a bag viewer and a selective imager.

3. Advanced Forensic Format

The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) is a single, flexible format that can be used for a variety of tasks. This section discusses AFF's design goals and its two-layered architecture that helps achieve the design goals.

3.1 AFF Goals

The specific design goals for AFF are provided below. We believe that AFF delivers on all these goals.

- Ability to store disk images with or without compression.
- Ability to store disk images of any size.
- Ability to store metadata within disk images or separately.

- Ability to store images in a single file of any size or split among multiple files.
- Arbitrary metadata as user-defined name/value pairs.
- Extensibility.
- Simple design.
- Multiple platform, open source implementation.
- Freedom from intellectual property restrictions.
- Provisions for internal self-consistency checking, so that part of an image can be recovered even if other parts are corrupted or otherwise lost.
- Provisions for certifying the authenticity of evidence files with traditional hash functions (e.g., MD5 and SHA-1) and advanced digital signatures based on X.509(v)3 certificates.

3.2 AFF Layers

Many of the design goals are accomplished by partitioning the AFF format into two layers: the disk-representation layer and the data-storage layer. The disk-representation layer defines a schema that is used for storing disk images and associated metadata. The data-storage layer specifies how the named AFF segments are stored in an actual file. We have developed two data-storage implementations.

3.2.1 AFF Disk-Representation Layer. AFF's disk-representation layer defines specific segment names that are used for representing all the information associated with a disk image. Each AFF segment consists of a segment name, a 32-bit "flag," and a data payload. The name and the data payload can be between 0 and $2^{32} - 1 = 4,294,967,295$ bytes long. In practice, segment names are less than 32 bytes, while the data payload is less than 16 MB.

AFF 1.0 supports two kinds of segments: metadata segments, which are used for holding information about the disk image, and data segments called "pages," which are used for holding the imaged disk information itself.

Metadata segments can be created when a disk is accessioned or after a disk is imaged. For example, `device_sn` is the name of the segment used to hold the disk's serial number, while `date_acquired` holds the time that the disk image was acquired.

Two special segments are `accession_gid`, which holds a 128-bit globally unique identifier that is different each time the disk imaging program is run, and `badflag`, which holds a 512-byte block of data that identifies blocks in the data segments that are “bad” (i.e., cannot be read). The existence of the `badflag` makes it possible for forensic tools to distinguish between sectors that cannot be read and sectors that are filled with NULLs or another form of constant data, something that is not possible with traditional disk forensic tools. Tools that do not support the `badflag` will interpret each “bad” sector as a sector that begins with the words “BAD SECTOR” followed by random data; these sectors can thus be identified as being bad if they are encountered by a human examiner. Alternatively, AFF can be configured to return bad sectors as sectors filled with NULLs. Table 3 provides a complete list of the segment names defined in AFF 1.0.

Data segments hold the actual data copied from the disk being examined. All data segments must be the same size; this size is determined when the image file is created and stored in a segment named `pagesize`. Although `pagesize` can be any value, common choices are 2^{20} (1 MB) and 2^{24} (16 MB).

Segments are given sequential names `page 0`, `page 1`, ..., `page n`, where `n` is as large as is necessary. The segment (page) number and byte offset within the uncompressed segment of any 512-byte sector i in the AFF file are determined by the formulas:

$$\text{page number} = \frac{i \times 512}{\text{pagesize}} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{offset} = (i \times 512) - (\text{page \#}) \times \text{pagesize} \quad (2)$$

AFF data pages can be compressed with the open-source `zlib` [10] or they can be left uncompressed. The data page’s 32-bit flag encodes if the page is compressed or not. Compressed AFF files consume less space but take more time to create; this is because the time taken to write uncompressed data is typically shorter than the combined time taken to compress data and write the compressed data. Interestingly, compressed files can actually be faster to read than uncompressed files as modern computers can read and uncompress data faster than they can read the equivalent uncompressed data of a hard drive. The decision to compress or not to compress can be made when an image is acquired. Alternatively, an uncompressed file can be compressed later.

Checksums and signatures can be used to certify that data in the image data segments has not been accidentally or intentionally modified

Table 3. AFF segments defined in the AFF 1.0 specification.

| Segment Name | AFFLIB Symbol | Meaning |
|--|------------------------|---|
| <i>Housekeeping Segments</i> | | |
| — | AF_IGNORE | Ignore this segment; zero-length name. |
| dir | AF_DIRECTORY | AFF directory; should be the last segment. |
| <i>AFF Segments (pertaining to the entire image)</i> | | |
| pagesize | AF_SEGSIZE | Size (in bytes) of each uncompressed AFF data page is stored in segment “flag” field. |
| imagesize | AF_IMAGESIZE | Size (in bytes) of the complete image is stored in the segment data area. (8-byte value). |
| badsectors | AF_BADSECTORS | Number of 512-byte sectors in the image that were marked as “bad.” |
| badflag | AF_BADFLAG | 512-byte flag that is used to denote sectors in the image file that could not be read from the media. |
| blanksectors | AF_BLANKSECTORS | Number of sectors in the image file that are completely blank (i.e., filled with 512 ASCII NULLs.) |
| <i>AFF Pages (repeated for each data segment)</i> | | |
| page%d | AF_PAGE | The actual data of page %d. Data is compressed if the AF_PAGE_COMPRESSED bit in the flag is set. |
| page_md5_%d | AF_PAGE_MD5HASH | MD5 of the uncompressed page. |
| page_md5_sig%d | AF_PAGE_MD5SIG | PKCS7 signature of page %d’s MD5. |
| page_sha1_%d | AF_PAGE_SHA1HASH | SHA-1 of the uncompressed page. |
| page_sha1_sig%d | AF_PAGE_SHA1SIG | PKCS7 signature of page %d’s SHA-1. |
| <i>Some AFF Segments created by the Advanced Disk Imager</i> | | |
| case_num | AF_CASE_NUM | Case number for EnCase compatibility. |
| image_gid | AF_IMAGE_GID | A unique 128-bit image identifier. |
| imaging_commandline | AF_IMAGING_COMMANDLINE | Complete command used to create image. |
| imaging_date | AF_IMAGING_DATE | Date and time when imaging was started. |
| imaging_notes | AF_IMAGING_NOTES | Notes made by the forensic examiner when the imaging was started. |
| imaging_device | AF_IMAGING_DEVICE | Device used as the source of the image. |

after it was acquired. AFF 1.0 supports two modes of certification: hashes and digital signatures.


It is common practice in the forensic community to record MD5 or SHA-1 hashes of an image. AFF 1.0 allows these hashes to be recorded for the entire image and for each individual data segment. The hash values are stored in specially named segments.

AFF 1.0 provides an additional level of certification by supporting the inclusion of PKCS #7 [16] digital signatures. These signatures can also be recorded for the entire disk image and for individual data segments. Because signatures are calculated on uncompressed data, it is possible to acquire and digitally sign a disk image and then compress the image without compromising the integrity of the digital signatures.

3.2.2 AFF Data-Storage Layer. The data-storage layer handles the task of storing the actual AFF segments. AFF 1.0 has two storage formats. The AFF 1.0 Binary Format specifies that segments are stored sequentially in one or more files. AFF 1.0 XML, on the other hand, stores information in the XML format. The binary files are smaller and faster than the XML files. However, the standardized format of the XML files makes them easier to use with non-forensic tools. In practice, it is possible to store the actual disk image in an AFF binary file and the disk's metadata in an XML file, although this does introduce the possibility that the two files might become separated.


The original plan for AFF's Binary Format was to use an open-source B-tree implementation like Berkeley DB (BDB), the GNU Database Manager (GDBM), or a similar system to store the segments as a series of name/value pairs. But BDB and GDBM are distributed under the GNU Public License, which is unacceptable to many commercial software developers. (A licensed version of BDB with fewer restrictions can be obtained from SleepyCat Software [21], but not for free.) The Apache SDBM database has no such restrictions. However, our tests indicate that SDBM creates sparse files exceeding 100 GB when used to store just a few GB of image data. Note that because the files are sparse, they do not take up all the space on disk. However, if a file is copied to another disk, the unmapped sectors are filled with zeroes. Another concern is that the layout of information in a B-tree file might be too complex to explain in court, should the need arise.

Consequently, we adopted a simple approach for storing AFF segments in a binary file. Each AFF 1.0 binary file consists of a header followed by zero or more binary AFF segments. Each binary AFF segment consists of a header, a variable-length segment name, a 32-bit flag, a variable-length data area, and a segment footer. The segment's length



AFF File
(Not to Scale)

Figure 2. AFF file schematic.



AFF Segment
(Not to Scale)

Figure 3. AFF segment schematic.

is stored in the header and footer, allowing for rapid bidirectional seeking as only the headers and the footers need to be read.

Figures 2 and 3 present schematic representations of an AFF file and segment, respectively. The AFF file schematic shows the file's header and AFF segments. The AFF segment schematic shows the segment's header, name, data and segment tail. Including the segment's length at the beginning and the end makes it possible to rapidly seek through a large AFF file without having to read all of the data in each segment.

The AFF XML 1.0 Format is a simplistic encoding of name/value segments as a series of XML objects. This XML encoding can be produced automatically from an AFF binary file using the `afxml` tool that we have developed.

4. AFF Library and Tools

AFFLIB™ is an implementation of AFF 1.0 written in C/C++. To avoid forcing the programmer to understand segments, data segments, compression, etc., AFFLIB implements a simple abstraction that makes the AFF image file appear as two resources: a simple name/value database that can be accessed with traditional `put` and `get` semantics and a stream that can be accessed using `af_open()`, `af_read()`, and `af_seek()` function calls. If `af_open()` is used to open a non-AFF file, the library defaults to a pass-through mode of operation, allowing AFF-aware programs to work equally well with raw files.

AFFLIB also supports an `af_write` function call—even across compressed data segments—which makes it easier to write disk imaging programs.

The AFF source code comes with a set of tools including AImage: Advanced Disk Imager (`aimage`), a program for converting AFF metadata into XML (`afxml`), a program for converting raw images to AFF images and back (`afconvert`).


In addition, we have modified Sleuth Kit [6] to work with AFF files. The modifications are relatively minor and have already been incorporated into Sleuth Kit's distribution. When run interactively, no performance degradation is noticeable—not even on compressed AFF files.

5. Advanced Disk Imager

In the early days of our forensics work, we acquired disk images using the Unix `dd` [2] program. Although running `dd` with the correct arguments can be very fast, the program has several shortcomings. The `dd` program does not automatically retry read attempts on bad sectors. If there is a bad region on the disk, `dd` attempts to plod its way through the region, which can take a very long time. It is easy to corrupt a disk by accidentally reversing or otherwise mistyping the values of the `if=` and `of=` arguments. Finally, `dd` does not capture forensic metadata such as the serial number of a hard drive or even the time of the acquisition.

Consequently, we decided to create a new disk imaging program. Our Advanced Disk Imager (`aimage`) was developed specifically for the demanding task of imaging large numbers of hard drives purchased on the secondary market. We have tested `aimage` on several hundred different hard drives and have found it to be a very powerful disk-imaging tool.

Written in C++, `aimage` is designed to be run from the command line. It can image any device that is visible to the operating system. The program can also create an image from data sent to it over a network using an unencrypted or encrypted TCP connection.



```

Terminal — ssh — 80x24
IMAGING Thu Nov 10 10:53:27 2005
Source device: /dev/od2 AFF Output: /project/junk.aff
Model #: QUANTUM FIREBALL ST3.2A
firmware: A0F.0000 Sector size: 512 bytes
S/N: 153718340531 Total sectors:6,306,048

-----]
Currently reading sector: 97,792 (512 sectors at once)
Sectors read: 98,304 ( 1.56%) # blank: 1,026

Time spent reading: 00:00:05 Estimated total time left: 00:21:34
Total bytes read: 50,331,648

Compressed bytes written: 25,735,396
Time spent compressing: 00:00:09
Overall compression ratio: 48.87% (0% is none; 100% is perfect)
Free space on 192.168.1.1:/project: 68,937 MB (12.44%)

```

Figure 4. Screenshot of `aimage` in action.

The `aimage` program can create a raw file (in the so-called “dd” format), an AFF file, or both files at the same time. The program offers a real-time display on a 80×24 screen detailing the status of the image capture. By using a text-based interface, `aimage` can be run from a bootable Linux distribution on computers that do not support the X Window System. A screenshot of `aimage` is shown in Figure 4.

A sophisticated error-handling system causes `aimage` to read large data blocks unless it encounters an error, in which case it switches to a smaller block size and attempts to re-read the data. If it encounters too many errors in a row the program goes to the end of the disk and attempts to image the remaining disk sectors in reverse. This approach, pioneered by the `dd_rescue` [11] forensics program, works well to recover disks that have a single region of bad blocks. A future version of `aimage` will allow the remaining bad region to be further bisected so that additional good blocks can be recovered.

The `aimage` program calculates MD5 and SHA-1 hashes of a disk as the disk is imaged. Plans are underway to implement digital signatures as prescribed by the AFF standard.

6. Conclusions

The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) is an attractive, tested system for storing forensic disk images. With the Advanced Disk Imager we

have collected images from nearly a thousand hard drives over the past year. AFF's tools have enabled us to work with these images quickly, efficiently and at a very high level. AFFLIB's support of additional file formats, e.g., EnCase and Expert Witness, permits the tools to be used for a variety of disk image formats without the need for modification or translation. AFF and AFFLIB may be downloaded from www.afflib.org.

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